From Revolutionary Coalitions to Bilateral Deterrence: A Nonzero-Sum Approach to Social Power by Lawler, Edward J
Cornell University ILR School 
DigitalCommons@ILR 
Articles and Chapters ILR Collection 
1993 
From Revolutionary Coalitions to Bilateral Deterrence: A Nonzero-
Sum Approach to Social Power 
Edward J. Lawler 
Cornell University, ejl3@cornell.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles 
 Part of the Labor Relations Commons, and the Organizational Behavior and Theory Commons 
Thank you for downloading an article from DigitalCommons@ILR. 
Support this valuable resource today! 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the ILR Collection at DigitalCommons@ILR. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Articles and Chapters by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@ILR. For more 
information, please contact catherwood-dig@cornell.edu. 
If you have a disability and are having trouble accessing information on this website or need materials in an 
alternate format, contact web-accessibility@cornell.edu for assistance. 
From Revolutionary Coalitions to Bilateral Deterrence: A Nonzero-Sum Approach 
to Social Power 
Abstract 
This chapter reviews a program of work investigating how social power, defined as a structurally based 
capability, affects the tactics chosen in a conflict. A nonzero-sum approach to power stipulates that the 
total amount of power in a relationship can have effects distinct from those of relative power or power 
difference. This assumption is grounded in Emerson's power dependence theory and reminiscent of 
Tannenbaum's concept of control. The basic ideas are that (1) higher total power in a relationship has an 
integrative effect on that relationship, resulting in more conciliatory and less hostile responses to conflict; 
and (2) larger power differences have divisive effects on a relationship, making conflict resolution less 
conciliatory and more hostile. Research on revolutionary coalitions, power dependence processes in 
bargaining, and bilateral deterrence exemplify and support the importance of the nonzero-sum approach 
to power. 
Keywords 
social power, conflict, tactics, power dependence theory, revolutionary coalitions, bilateral deterrence 
Disciplines 
Labor Relations | Organizational Behavior and Theory 
Comments 
Suggested Citation 
Lawler, E. J. (1993). From revolutionary coalitions to bilateral deterrence: A nonzero-sum approach to 
social power [Electronic version]. In J. K. Murnighan (Ed.) Social psychology in organizations: Advances in 
theory and research (pp. 269-295). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
Required Publisher Statement 
© Pearson Education. Reprinted with permission. All rights reserved. 
This article is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles/653 
• • • CHAPTER THIRTEEN 
From Revolutionary Coalitions to Bilateral 
Deterrence: A Nonzero-Sum Approach 
to Social Power* 
E D W A R D J. LAWLER 
University of Iowa 
This chapter reviews a program of work investigating how social power, defined 
as a structurally based capability, affects the tactics chosen in a conflict. A nonzero-sum 
approach to power stipulates that the total amount of power in a relationship can have 
effects distinct from those of relative power or power difference. This assumption is 
grounded in Emerson's power dependence theory and reminiscent of Tannenbaum's 
concept of control. The basic ideas are that (1) higher total power in a relationship 
has an integrative effect on that relationship, resulting in more conciliatory and less 
hostile responses to conflict; and (2) larger power differences have divisive effects on 
a relationship, making conflict resolution less conciliatory and more hostile. Research 
on revolutionary coalitions, power dependence processes in bargaining, and bilateral 
deterrence exemplify and support the importance of the nonzero-sum approach to 
power. 
W h e n individuals , g roups , or organizat ions experience a conflict of interest , 
they can r e spond in a variety of ways . O n e c o m m o n response is to a t t empt to in-
fluence the o ther par ty by choos ing a m o n g some set of available tactics; ano the r 
is to avoid the re la t ionship or si tuation in which the conflict can occur; still an-
other is to d o no th ing r ight away except work to improve one ' s p o w e r posi t ion 
in prepara t ion for one of the first two opt ions . Threa ten ing or damag ing action 
is an example of the first opt ion; leaving the scene, an example of the second; 
a n d forming a coalition wi th o thers , of the thi rd . Along wi th a variety of o the r 
social psychologists (e.g. , Deutsch , 1973; Kipnis , 1976; Kipnis & Schmidt , 1983; 
*The author expresses appreciation to Samuel B. Bacharach, with whom many of the projects de-
scribed herein were developed jointly. In addition, Rebecca Ford has contributed to the author's 
thinking about this theory and research program in important ways. 
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Tedeschi, Schlenker, & Bonoma, 1973), my program of research has taken the 
concept of power as central to understanding how actors respond to a conflict 
and in particular how they react to an opponent's response. This chapter re-
views the conceptual odyssey of this research program (e.g., Bacharach & 
Lawler, 1980, 1981a; Lawler, 1975a&b, 1986, 1992). 
Virtually all parts of the program—from the early research on revolution-
ary coalitions (Lawler, 1975) to more recent work on bilateral deterrence (Lawler, 
1986)—should be interpreted as an effort to understand power processes, in 
particular when people use power and how they use it (see Bacharach & Lawler, 
1981a). One fundamental question has consistently driven this program of work: 
How does power, defined as a structurally based capability, affect the tactical use of 
power? This chapter presents the abstract, theoretical position on power that has 
emerged in the work over the last 20 years. More specifically, it presents the the-
oretical framework, analyzes the central themes or theoretical propositions, and 
shows how these themes are stimulating work on some new issues (see also 
Lawler, 1992; Lawler & Ford, in press). 
Broadly construed, the framework on power embedded in our work pulls 
together ideas, somewhat selectively, from sociology, social psychology, and the 
study of organizations. A few examples help set the stage for what follows. 
From sociological analyses, we adopt a social structural perspective on the 
sources of conflict (Dahrendorf, 1959). From some organizational theory, we 
adopt the notion that social structure is an objective, external phenomenon that 
has both a horizontal and vertical dimension (e.g., Blau, 1977). From Emerson's 
power dependence theory, we extract a nonzero-sum conception of power, 
which emphasizes structurally based, rather than interpersonally based, power. 
From social psychological research, such as that treated by Rubin and Brown 
(1975) and Pruitt (1981), we adopt a tactical approach to the use of power in con-
flict. Overall, the terms social structure, power, and tactics capture the theoretical 
content of the research program. Revolutionary coalitions and two-party bar-
gaining have been the major substantive topics. 
In this conceptual biography, I focus very heavily on the conceptual, as op-
posed to the empirical, side of the research program. The conceptual side of the 
program is treated in terms of two elements: the metatheory and the set of testa-
ble propositions or theories spawned by the metatheory. A metatheory refers to 
a set of fundamental assumptions that orient and shape theorizing about some 
phenomenon, often in subtle, nonconscious ways (Wagner & Berger, 1985). 
Field theory and social exchange theory are examples of basic metatheories 
found in the literature on power. A theory is essentially a set of abstract, testable 
claims or propositions about the causes or effects of a phenomenon (Wagner, 
1984). Power dependence theory (Emerson 1962, 1972) is an example of a theory 
of power falling within a social exchange metatheory. 
Metatheories are important because they define the substantive problems 
of theoretical interest, indicate how those problems should be investigated, and 
establish boundaries around the sort of theoretical solutions deemed satisfactory 
(Berger, Wagner, & Zelditch, 1987; Lawler & Ford, in press; Wagner, 1984). 
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Much can be learned by teasing out metatheories and juxtaposing them with 
testable parts of theorizing. We believe, along with a growing number of sociolo-
gists (e.g., Berger et al., 1987), that more explicit metatheorizing can promote 
better theorizing. Thus, one purpose of this chapter is to use the distinction be-
tween metatheory and theory to present and analyze my own program of work; 
a second purpose is to illustrate how more explicitness about metatheories might 
stimulate interesting and important theoretical shifts (see also Lawler & Ford, in 
press). 
The chapter is divided into five sections, corresponding to several distinct 
stages of development within the theory and research program. The first stage 
consisted primarily of research on revolutionary coalitions. This work focused 
on the determinants of a single tactic; it was highly problem driven. The second 
stage was a series of empirical papers using power dependence theory to under-
stand how actors evaluate and choose among a set of tactics. In this work, a rev-
olutionary coalition is but one among a set of possible tactics suggested by 
power dependence theory. The third stage was essentially a theoretical interlude, 
in which Bacharach and I produced books on Power and Politics in Organizations 
(1980) and Bargaining (1981a). This was the point at which the metatheory crys-
tallized, and the research became more theory driven. The fourth stage was to de-
velop and test theoretical notions that relate power capability and power use. 
The fifth stage is taking the main ideas (e.g., theoretical propositions) and using 
them to address other issues, such as the effectiveness of unilateral initiatives in 
bargaining and commitment in social exchange relations. 
STAGE 1: REVOLUTIONARY COALITIONS 
The research on revolutionary conditions developed from the early work of 
Caplow (1956) and Gamson (1961) on coalition formation. The Caplow/Gamson 
tradition asked which of the possible winning coalitions will form, assuming that 
a coalition is virtually inevitable (see Murnighan, 1978, for a review). Our re-
search asked a different question—namely, under what conditions will two or 
more subordinates in a status hierarchy mobilize a coalition against a group 
leader (Lawler, 1975a, 1975b, 1983; Lawler & Thompson, 1978; Lawler, Youngs, 
& Lesh, 1978; Michener & Lawler, 1971; Michener & Lyons, 1972). This work fo-
cused on a particular type of coalition and addressed its capacity to mobilize. 
The research assumed a status hierarchy in which three or more actors 
work on and receive a group outcome from a collective task. The leader had the 
authority, legitimized on the basis of merit, to allocate group outcomes. The ma-
jor focus was on the conditions determining when subordinates will engage in a 
collective revolt in response to an inequitable allocation of group outcomes by 
the leader. In this context, a series of experiments conducted from the early 
1970s to the early 1980s yielded several important findings. 
First, inequity produced revolts, not by simply generating the emotional or 
attitudinal responses emphasized in equity theory such as dissatisfaction or an-
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ger, but by creating mutual expectations among the subordinates that they are 
likely to share dissatisfaction (Lawler, 1975a, 1975b). To put it another way, col-
lective responses to inequity were mediated by expectations of mutual support. 
Presumably, such expectations were fostered by a "sense of common position" 
produced by a leader's inequitable action. The most exciting implication of these 
results was that expectations of support from other subordinates were actually 
more important than negative individual feelings or attitudes toward leaders 
(see especially Lawler 1975a). 
The second finding was closely connected to the importance of expecta-
tions of mutual support. Specifically, we found that a leader could treat subordi-
nates inequitably and forestall a revolt with a co-optation tactic, involving an 
offer to promote one of two subordinates to an intermediate position in the 
social structure or hierarchy (Lawler, 1983; Lawler, Youngs, & Lesh, 1978). 
Through a subtle process of tacit bargaining, revealed by interaction data, such 
an offer by the leader to one of two subordinates made the favored subordinate a 
bit more reluctant to form a coalition and the other disfavored subordinate more 
hesitant to push for a revolt in anticipation of opposition from the favored subor-
dinate. Through such a tacit-bargaining process, inequitable reward allocations 
by the leader produced revolts about 20 percent of the time when such a tactic 
was used by the leader and roughly 80 percent of the time in the absence of a co-
optation tactic (see Lawler, et al., 1978). Figure 1 summarizes the implications of 
the research. 
Other findings of this research indicate that subordinates were more in-
clined toward a revolt in response to inequity if the leader was perceived as 
highly responsible for the inequitable allocation of group benefit (Lawler & 
Thompson, 1978), or if the coalition had the power to redistribute outcomes 
rather than simply to punish the leader (Lawler & Thompson, 1979). In addition, 
the co-optation tactic was effective only if it provided significant benefits to the 
recipient and if the promotion offer from the leader was stated in fairly definite 
rather than probabilistic or "maybe" terms; that is, the leader conveyed that the 
promotion was virtually assured if there was no coalition by subordinates 
(Lawler et al., 1978). 
FIGURE 1 Implications of Research on Revolutionary Coalitions 
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Overall, the research on revolutionary coalitions produced a coherent body 
of findings, but not a theory. The closest this work came to a theory was the 
identification of three necessary conditions for a revolt: a normative or moral jus-
tification for upsetting the status hierarchy or acting contrary to it, a perception 
that a revolt would successfully influence or depose the leader, and an expecta-
tion that it would be possible to mobilize joint action with the other subordinates 
(see Lawler et al., 1978). These normative, utilitarian, and organizational factors 
subsumed the specific conditions found to affect the occurrence of revolts in this 
series of experiments. 
STAGE 2: EARLY RESEARCH ON POWER DEPENDENCE 
The search for a better theory led to Emerson's (1962, 1972) power dependence 
notion and a related shift in the research focus. Emerson offered a concise, ap-
pealing concept of power and, more important at the time, a multidimensional 
conceptualization of tactics, one of which was a coalition. Emerson's theory put 
coalitional action in the context of other, individual-based tactics that could be 
available. Thus, the theory raised questions, such as when do subordinates 
choose a coalition from among a variety of tactics and, more generally, how do 
subordinates in a hierarchy choose among a range of tactics? The research 
agenda was expanded accordingly. 
The basic principle of power dependence theory is that the power of party 
A is based on party B's dependence on A and vice versa. More specifically, B's 
dependence on A is a function of how highly B values the outcomes or benefits 
from the relationship with A and the availability of those outcomes in other rela-
tionships. The theory, therefore, suggests four dimensions of dependence in a 
dyad: the availability of alternative persons or partners to A, the value or impor-
tance that A attributes to the benefits received in the relationship with B, the 
availability of alternative persons or partners to B, and the value of the benefits 
to B. These four dimensions of dependence imply a broad set of tactics for in-
fluencing another or for improving one's power position (see Bacharach & 
Lawler, 1980, chap. 7; Blegen & Lawler, 1989). A revolutionary coalition, for in-
stance, is conceptualized in this scheme as an effort to reduce the alternative 
sources of benefit for the other (see Emerson, 1962). Power dependence theory 
provides a few parsimonious ideas with broad applicability. 
Bacharach and I initiated the power dependence research of the program in 
a series of papers on how a subordinate (employee) in conflict or disagreement 
with a superior (employer) evaluates and chooses among the four tactics speci-
fied by power dependence theory (Bacharach & Lawler, 1976, 1981b; Lawler & 
Bacharach, 1976, 1979). To address these issues, we used vignettes in which an 
employee of a small business store wanted a pay raise but knew the employer 
was against it. We investigated both the employee subjects' tendencies to use 
each tactic and also their expectations concerning the employer response to their 
attempts at influencing the decision about pay. 
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To make the transition from what is essentially a social structural theory to 
the choice of tactics, we adapted the "treatment of choice" metaphor used quite 
effectively by David Kipnis (1976). The resulting hypothesis was that actors 
would use the dimensions of dependence to identify points of strength or weak-
ness in their own or the other's power position. Different tactics (of the four sug-
gested) deal with or respond to different sources of strength or weakness. Actors 
ostensibly would attach probabilities of success to each tactic based on whether 
it uses a strength or mitigates a weakness (Bacharach & Lawler, 1980, 1981b; 
Lawler & Bacharach, 1976, 1979). For an obvious example, a threat to leave 
would be used more if the employee had many alternatives; similarly, a coalition 
would be most likely when the employer had many alternatives. In sum, this 
work took Kipnis's idea that an actor facing resistance from another will diag-
nose the reasons for the resistance and apply the "treatment" (i.e., tactic) with 
the highest probability of success. The prime differences are that in our ap-
proach, the reasons are structural, not motivational, and the treatments explicitly 
use this structure in some fashion. It is also important to note that our purpose 
here was to elaborate and test the implications of a particular theory, Emerson's 
power dependence theory, not to comprehensively identify and examine the 
sort of tactics used by an employee to influence an employer. In this sense, the 
work had and continues to have different purposes than that of Kipnis and 
Schmidt (1983). 
The empirical results supported many of the hypotheses developed from 
power dependence theory. First, in a study of perceptions of power, Bacharach 
and Lawler (1976) found that each of the four dimensions of dependence did af-
fect a subordinate's perceptions of self and other's power as predicted (Bacha-
rach & Lawler, 1976). Second, in a study of how the subjective expected utility of 
attempting influence is affected by the power dependence relation, Lawler and 
Bacharach (1979) found that subordinates attached a higher subjective utility to 
influence when they had many alternatives and the employer had few. Third, 
we found that different dimensions of dependence affected different tactics— 
or, more precisely, each of the four tactics as a function of different dimensions 
of dependence. The mapping of the tactics on the dimensions of dependence, 
however, was not completely consistent with Emerson's (1962) version of power 
dependence theory. 
The departure from power dependence theory took one basic form. When 
assessing the four tactical options suggested by the theory, actors attributed 
more importance to their own dependence on the opponent, rather than the op-
ponent's dependence on them. In fact, all four tactics of a subordinate were a 
function primarily of the subordinate's own dependence on the superior. The 
broad implication was that people did not interpret the power relationship solely 
in relative terms. They treated their own and the other's power partly in abso-
lute terms and somewhat independently. This led us to question prevailing 
zero-sum conceptions of power and triggered a shift toward a nonzero-sum con-
ception (see Gamson, 1968 for a discussion). Reexamining Emerson's power de-
pendence formulation, we found important justification for such a shift. In fact, 
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it became evident that power dependence theory had an implicit nonzero-sum 
feature left undeveloped by Emerson and his colleagues (Cook & Emerson, 1978; 
Emerson, 1972, 1981). At this point, we set out to develop the nonzero-sum side 
of Emerson's writings. The basic metatheory of the program began to crystalize, 
and this led to the third stage of the program. 
The transition to the third stage is in part a transition from a "problem-
driven" to "theory-driven" research enterprise. The first two stages emphasized 
a particular substantive issue (i.e., the determinants of a revolutionary coalition 
or the choice among a range of tactics). By the third stage, we had become more 
interested in the abstract social processes connecting a wide variety of substan-
tive phenomena and committed to elaborating and developing power depen-
dence notions beyond their previous boundaries. It was at this point that we be-
gan explicitly to "zero in" on the relationship between power capability and 
power use. 
The basic difference of emphasis between problem-driven and theory-
driven programs is worthy of note. Problem-driven programs are oriented to 
producing a substantial accumulation of information or data on a particular topic 
(e.g., inventories of effects or causes). Review articles exemplify the culmination 
of such research programs. Theory-driven programs tend to produce more theo-
retical formulations and much less concrete information or data over time (i.e., a 
higher ratio of theory or ideas to data (see Berger & Zelditch, in press). One can 
certainly argue about the merits of each approach, yet there is clearly an imbal-
ance in favor of problem-driven programs, not just in social psychology but 
across the social sciences. 
STAGE 3: DEVELOPMENT OF A METATHEORETICAL 
FRAMEWORK 
The metatheory took initial shape in Bacharach and Lawler's books of 1980 and 
1981, one on political processes in organizations and the other on two-party bar-
gaining. The metatheory has continued to evolve and, at this point, is captured 
by three basic assumptions about power. 
T h e p o w e r - p r o c e s s a s s u m p t i o n 
The research program adopts very sharp distinctions between power as a capa-
bility, the use of that power, and actual or realized power (Lawler, 1992). Analy-
ses of power—in the larger sociological, psychological, and political science 
literatures and in the more specific literature on conflict and bargaining—tend to 
reveal three emphases. First, some analyses treat power as a potential or capabil-
ity to influence the opponent (Bierstedt, 1950; Chamberlain, 1955; Emerson, 
1972). These tend to reflect a structural emphasis. Second, some analyses focus 
on how people use power or the tactics directed at influencing another (Blalock, 
1989; Kipnis, 1976; Strauss, 1978; Tedeschi et al., 1973). These tend to reflect a 
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behavioral or tactical emphasis. A tactic is defined as a move or set of moves di-
rected at influencing another's cognition or behavior (Lawler, 1992). Third, some 
analyses essentially reduce power to the result of an influence process (Dahl, 
1957; Dunlop, 1950; Gray & Tallman, 1987). These reflect an outcome or "who re-
ally has it" emphasis. The three conceptions of power, of course, are comple-
mentary, and all are important to an understanding of power relations (for 
supporting evidence, see Molm, 1990). 
Our framework treats power capability, power use, and actual power as 
distinct moments in a power process (Lawler, 1992). In any power process, ac-
tors ostensibly have a structurally-based capability to affect each other's re-
sources, an option to use or not use that capability, and an uncertain probability 
of success. Thus, it is clear that a power capability may or may not be used and, 
if used, it may or may not be effective. This sort of conceptualization is consis-
tent in general with many others, especially the social exchange formulations of 
Cook (Cook & Emerson, 1978) and Molm (1987) and the organizational perspec-
tive of Pfeffer (1981). 
A sharp distinction between these three parts of a power process raises a 
number of important research questions (Lawler, 1992): When do parties use a 
power capability available to them? If a power capability is used, what tactical 
form does the power use (i.e., tactics) take? When does the use of a power capa-
bility result in actual power? Are there conditions under which a power capabil-
ity itself—without the mediation of action—produces actual or realized power? 
All of these questions are important. But some or all of them are neglected by 
conceptions of power that dismiss one or more of the moments in the assumed 
power process. Furthermore, with approaches—or measures—that equate 
power with effective or successful power, such theoretical questions are virtually 
defined away (e.g., Dahl, 1957; Dunlop, 1950). Our framework keeps all three 
questions very much alive. 
T h e socia l s t ruc ture a s s u m p t i o n 
The second assumption is a fairly subtle one about the foundation of the conflict 
likely to activate a power process. Specifically, we assume that most conflicts— 
whether between individuals, groups, organizations, or societies—have some 
social structural basis (Lawler, 1992). Power capabilities are grounded in struc-
ture. Our focus on power capability and power use is, therefore, tantamount to 
a focus on social structure and social action. The principal units of structure are 
sets of interrelated positions, abstractly representing the places that people or 
groups can come to occupy. Structure should have both a horizontal and vertical 
dimension in most contexts, and following the macrostructural theory of Blau 
(1977), these represent heterogeneity and inequality, respectively. 
The structural positions, formal or informal, that convey a power capability 
have associated interests. Occupants represent these interests, and the interests 
are likely to be passed on to successive occupants. For example, conflicts of in-
terest between sales and production managers over product lines tend to persist 
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even when the occupants of these positions change. All of this may sound famil-
iar and obvious, but in the social psychological literature on bargaining, there is 
a fairly subtle difference between structural and interpersonal interpretations or 
assumptions about the sources of conflict. An interpersonal approach is implied 
by Dean Pruitt's (1981) conceptualization of negotiation. He indicates that "ne-
gotiation is a process by which a joint decision is made by two or more parties 
[with opposing interests]," . . . (Pruitt, 1981, p . 1). To say that parties have op-
posing interests is to say that they have different individual needs leading to in-
compatible preferences. Pruitt (1981, p . 4) indicates further that "interests 
should never be regarded as inherently opposed." From such an interpersonal 
view, bargaining or negotiation becomes a form of primarily cooperative deci-
sion making, and the task of conflict resolution is primarily to reconcile individ-
ual needs and opinions (Lawler, 1992). 
In contrast, the social structure assumption stresses the competitive side of 
the mixed-motive dilemma. It indicates that conflict will continually resurface 
even if position occupants change (Dahrendorf, 1959; Ury, Brett, & Goldberg, 
1988), and it suggests that the resolution of conflict requires a change in the so-
cial structure of which the individuals or groups are a part. A structuralist prem-
ise sees conflict resolution as more problematic and temporary in ongoing 
relations such as those created by organizational structures (see Kanter, 1977). 
While structuralist and interpersonal premises are each useful for some 
purposes, it is important to recognize that our program comes down on the 
structural side, and this is one reason for its emphasis on distributive rather than 
integrative bargaining (Bacharach & Lawler, 1981a). 
The structural assumption must be tempered, however, to accommodate 
parties' capacities to define and redefine relevant power capabilities. Bacharach 
and Lawler (1981a) emphasized the cognitive nature of power, distinguished 
various imageries of power, and suggested that actors' responses to power de-
pend on their imagery. Parties interpret, translate, and otherwise make concrete 
the interests and power embedded in their social structural positions. They can 
bridge differences, find common ground, and otherwise reduce the conflict em-
anating from the social structure, or they can risk escalation of the conflict, at-
tempt to intimidate their opponent, or engage in aggression. Structural positions 
create and frame the conflict, but it is the occupants of positions in the structure 
who decide specifically how to deal with it (Lawler, 1992). 
The importance of position occupants is reflected in the fact that parties 
with smaller power capabilities can sometimes achieve greater influence than 
those with larger power capabilities; the use of some forms of power (especially 
coercion) over time can undermine the power of the user (Emerson's notion, "to 
use power is to lose it"); and tactics designed to gain advantage in the immediate 
situation may produce integrative rather than divisive effects on the relationship 
in the long run—for example, by increasing the mutual dependence of actors as 
we have shown elsewhere (Bacharach & Lawler, 1980; Lawler, 1992). This sug-
gests the importance of the tactical dimension of behavior. 
Power use is defined as a tactic chosen by an actor in the context of a struc-
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rurally determined power capability. Tactics have an impression management 
facet and flow ostensibly from conscious or nonconscious deliberation in which 
power is estimated, options assessed, and consequences anticipated. While this 
implies a rational choice process, it is highly bounded and subjective. For most 
purposes in our program, a simple and common two-fold classification of tactics, 
as conciliatory and hostile, is sufficient (see Pruitt, 1981; Lawler & Ford, in 
press). Conciliatory tactics are positive acts, communicating a willingness to co-
ordinate or collaborate; hostile tactics are negative acts, communicating an inten-
tion to compete or resist. 
The nonzero-sum assumption 
The most central assumption guiding recent theoretical work is a nonzero-sum 
conception of power (Lawler, 1986, 1992; Lawler & Bacharach, 1986; Lawler & 
Ford, in press). Zero-sum approaches to power take for granted a fixed sum of 
power in a relationship or set of relationships, such that a change in one party's 
power capability will produce an equal and opposite change in the other's. In 
—>>. contrast, a nonzero-sum conception indicates that the absolute or total amount 
of power in a relationship is not fixed, but variable. Given that the total or abso-
lute amount of power in a relationship can vary, both parties in a relation could 
experience an increase in power; both could experience a decrease; or, of course, 
one might gain power while the other's remains constant (Lawler, 1992). Nearly 
all approaches to power adopt a zero-sum conception in practice if not always 
in principle (see Gamson, 1968, Tannenbaum, 1968, and Kanter, 1977 for 
exceptions). 
Emerson's power dependence theory provides the basis for a nonzero-sum 
approach to power. Recall that from power dependence theory, the power capa-
bility of A is based on the dependence of B on A for valued resources, and vice 
versa (Emerson 1962, 1972). Thus, given the dimensions of dependence, the 
power of party A is a function of B's value and alternatives, while the power of B 
is a function of A's value and alternatives. Each party's power is based on the other's 
dependence on them, not their own dependence on the other. This is the ultimate source 
of the nonzero-sum premise found in power dependence theory. The implica-
tion is that the absolute power of each party in a dyad is not interrelated a priori 
in a specified way. The amount of power in the relationship can vary as can the 
distribution across the actors. This conceptualization is consistent with the no-
tion of Tannenbaum and Kahn (1958) that the total control in an organization 
can vary independent of its distribution across hierarchical levels. 
From a nonzero-sum conception, we have developed a contrast between 
the total power in a relationship and the relative power of the parties (or power 
differences) in that relationship. This contrast was initially proposed in the 1981 
bargaining book. I have developed it further (Lawler, 1986) in theory and re-
search on bilateral deterrence and conflict spiral (Lawler, 1986; Lawler, Ford, & 
Blegen, 1988). With the unit of analysis being a single relation or dyad, total 
power refers to the sum of each party's absolute power (i.e., Pab + Pba); relative 
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power refers to the power difference or ratio of each party's absolute power (i.e., 
Pab/[Pab + Pba]). Increases or decreases in total power involve changes in the 
degree of mutual dependence, or what Emerson (1972) termed "relational cohe-
sion." Shifts in relative power occur either through a redistribution of existing 
power, or when total power changes and these changes are distributed un-
equally within the relationship. 
The importance of the distinction between total and relative power is im-
plicit in Kanter's (1977) case study. She shows, for example, that increasing the 
power of middle managers does not necessarily decrease the power of lower 
level managers. If middle managers are "empowered" by becoming more in-
volved in strategy planning and external subunit relations, then their subordi-
nates might also be "empowered" through greater discretion and autonomy 
over the day-to-day activities of the subunit. The power of both middle and 
lower managers, thus, can move in the same direction. An expansion of the 
tasks or uncertainties faced by an organization or its subunits is a condition facil-
itating the growth of total power and essentially the empowerment of each party 
to the relationships (Kanter, 1977; Ch. 7). In a similar vein, Tannenbaum shows 
that enhanced participation in organizational decision making can increase ac-
tors' control over others but also their receptivity to control by them, thereby en-
hancing total control (see Tannenbaum, 1968). 
The main point is that relative and total power can change in a variety of 
interesting and somewhat independent ways. If two organizations over time be-
come the exclusive providers of valued commodities, then the total power in the 
relationship has grown without a change in the relative power, as long as the net 
growth of each party's absolute power is equal. If labor and management jockey 
for position between contract negotiation periods by successfully increasing the 
other's dependence, then the result of this power struggle will be a growth of 
mutual dependence in their relationship (Lawler, 1992). In an interpersonal con-
text, if actors with a close relationship each develop their own set of friends, 
then total power—and, hence, relational cohesion—declines without necessar-
ily changing their relative power. Yet if only one person develops a set of 
friends, a change in both total and relative power occurs, though in this case all 
of the change in total power would be an artifact of the change in relative power. 
The contrast of relative and total power disentangles two facets of a power rela-
tion that are typically confounded in research on power (see Lawler, 1986, for 
more discussion of this point). 
To take a more abstract illustration, assume that each party's absolute 
power can vary from 1 to 20 units and that the total power in the relationship can 
vary from 2 to 40 units. A nonzero-sum conception leads us to ask whether a re-
lationship in which each party has 5 units of power capability produces different 
rates of conflictual behavior than a relationship in which each party has 15 units 
of power capability. Furthermore, if a relationship with a distribution of 5 units 
for A and 20 for B changes to one with a distribution of 10 for A and 15 for B, 
then relative power has changed but total power has not. A more complex situa-
tion is one in which A has 5 units of power and B 15, but the change is to a situa-
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tion in which A has 10 units and B 30—in this case, total power has increased 
from 25 to 40 and the power difference has increased from 10 units to 20. A non-
zero-sum conception of power takes account of such patterns of change, while a 
zero-sum conception attends only to the power differences. 
F rom m e t a t h e o r y to theory 
The major research questions stem from the distinction of relative and total 
power: First, how does the total power in a relationship affect the use of concilia-
tory and hostile tactics in a conflict? Second, how do equal versus unequal 
power affect the use of conciliatory and hostile tactics in conflict? The general an-
swers to these questions are expressed in two propositions, which represent the 
common themes around which much of the specific theory and research can be 
organized (Lawler, 1992): 
* Total-power proposition: If parties have an equal power relationship and conflict oc-
curs, a relationship with higher total power will produce more conciliation and less 
hostility than a relationship with lower total power. 
* Relative-power proposition: If each party has a "significant" amount of absolute power 
and conflict occurs, a relationship with unequal power will produce more hostility 
and less conciliation than a relationship with equal power. 
The argument of the 1981 bargaining book was that the effect of power de-
pends on the degree that actors' imagery of power stresses absolute, relative, or 
total power. If actors adopt a nonzero conception of power, then they should re-
spond to variations of the total power in their relationship; if they adopt a zero-
sum imagery, then their tactical responses should be consistent with traditional 
models of power. 
The total-power proposition captures an implication of Emerson's power 
dependence theory as well as selected theorizing on deterrence in international 
contexts (Blalock, 1989; Emerson, 1972; Lawler, 1992; Morgan, 1977). In Emer-
son's terms, total power constitutes the level of mutual dependence or "rela-
tional cohesion" in the relationship. Higher total power in a relationship 
essentially produces an increase in the opportunity costs associated with leaving 
the relation (Lawler, 1992; Lawler & Bacharach, 1987); parties have a larger stake 
in the bargaining and, more specifically, in bringing it to a reasonable conclu-
sion. Thus, bargaining in relationships with higher, rather than lower, total 
power generally should be more cooperative and produce more mutually satis-
factory agreements. While counterexamples to this general pattern can be identi-
fied, this is the basic idea implied by power dependence theory (Emerson, 1962, 
1972). 
The relative power proposition expresses the notion that relationships with 
unequal power tend to be less stable than ones with equal power (cf. Emerson, 
1972; Rubin & Brown, 1975). A major reason, particularly important in explicit 
bargaining, is disagreement over the legitimacy of power differences or, specifi-
cally, how such differences should affect a negotiated solution. With an unequal 
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power relationship, the disadvantaged party may resist solutions that reflect 
their power differences, while the advantaged party may advocate those solu-
tions that provide them with payoffs proportional to their power advantage 
(Bacharach & Lawler, 1981a, chap. 6; Lawler, 1992; Lawler & Ford, in press). If 
power capabilities are unequal and parties face a conflict, then the legitimacy of 
the power difference is likely to be contested, because an equal split is generally 
a highly prominent solution (see Pruitt, 1981, and Schelling, 1960, for more dis-
cussion of "prominence"). Thus, unequal power tends to complicate the issues 
faced by parties to explicit bargaining, thereby reducing the prospects of conflict 
resolution. 
Focusing primarily on absolute and total power, we posed two primary 
hypotheses about bargaining. First, concession behavior of an actor would be a 
function of that party's own dependence, not the other's; and second, the 
greater the total power (i.e., mutual dependence) in the relationship the greater 
the likelihood of conflict resolution. The Bacharach and Lawler (1981b) experi-
ments provided parties information on each other's alternatives, and results 
generally supported these predictions. Concession behavior was primarily 
(though not exclusively) a function of whether the actor could expect a good 
agreement from an alternative bargaining partner; and greater total power in the 
relationship produced higher average rates of concession across actors. More-
over, in several experiments, agreements were more likely when both actors had 
alternative bargaining partners who were likely to offer poor rather than good al-
ternative outcomes. These results can be interpreted as "relational cohesion ef-
fects" in Emerson's (1972) terms, and they probably reflect the opportunity costs 
of leaving the current relationship to negotiate with another from whom a poor 
agreement is likely (see also Lawler, 1992). Overall, Bacharach and Lawler's 
(1981a) research supported a nonzero-sum conception of power, because parties 
in conflict did respond to the total power dimension. 
STAGE 4: BILATERAL DETERRENCE 
AND CONFLICT SPIRAL 
The fourth stage of the program not only fleshed out the different effects of total 
and relative power, but also dealt with a problem that we stumbled into while 
doing the book on bargaining. Emerson (1972) began with the fairly standard 
notion that power is the ability of an actor to levy costs on another, yet power 
dependence theory actually encompassed only one form of cost—opportunity 
costs (i.e., the value foregone when a choice is made). Retaliation or punishment 
costs were not easily incorporated, and this assumption made it difficult to di-
rectly connect power dependence theory to the use of hostile tactics, such as 
threats and punishments (see Bacharach & Lawler, 1981a; Lawler & Ford, in 
press; Molm, 1987). 
Following the 1981 book, I offered a simple theory of bilateral deterrence 
and conflict spiral (Lawler, 1986). The focus was still limited to the impact of 
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power capabilities on power use. In this sense, it was designed to understand 
the deterrent and spiral-like effects of power capabilities, per se. We assumed a 
situation where both parties in a dyad have a capability to damage each other 
punitively (e.g., see also Hornstein, 1965; Michener & Cohen, 1973). There were 
four steps in the development of this theoretical stage (see Lawler & Ford, in 
press, for a similar analysis). 
The first step involved the explication of two classic arguments, about the 
link between the magnitude of a punitive capability and the use of that capa-
bility through threats or punishments, one by Deutsch (1973) and the other by 
Tedeschi and associates (Tedeschi et al., 1973). The trucking-game tradition of 
Deutsch and Krauss (1962) and related work suggests that, when available, a 
power capability tends to be used and, by implication, the larger the capability 
the greater the frequency of use. Use ostensibly leads to counteruse, giving rise 
to a conflict spiral from which everyone loses (Youngs, 1986). The central argu-
ment is that, all other things being equal, where parties have larger punitive ca-
pabilities, a conflict between them should produce greater hostility. 
The alternative argument is based on other social psychological research 
that implicitly or explicitly incorporates principles of deterrence. For example, 
Tedeschi's analysis of threats (Tedeschi et al., 1973) indicates that a large power 
capability for A decreases B's use of hostile tactics (see also Hornstein, 1965; 
Michener & Cohen, 1973). These different lines of research represent a compli-
cated disjuncture between underlying perspectives, which had been overlooked 
in reviews of this literature (e.g., Pruitt, 1981). My purpose was to reconstruct 
these classic arguments in a way that revealed their incongruencies. Figure 2 
contains this reconstruction. An equal-power relationship is assumed at this 
point. 
The classic deterrence argument is that each actor's use of punitive tactics 
will be an inverse function of the other's (absolute) power capability (Lawler, 
1986). The other's capability produces a "fear of retaliation" that is crucial to ef-
fective deterrence. The conflict spiral argument, in contrast, indicates that larger 
power capabilities create more temptation to use power. Overall, the classic ar-
guments specify different mediating processes—fear of retaliation versus temp-
tation—and indicate that an actor's use of punitive tactics is a function of differ-
ent absolute power dimensions within the relationship. 
This characterization of the two arguments, however, also points to a theo-
retical problem. Each implicit theory traces power use to either an actor's own or 
the other's power capability, but not both (Lawler, 1986). The conflict spiral argu-
ment suggests that parties use power simply because they have some, while the 
deterrence argument suggests that parties do not use power because of the op-
ponents' power. Neither theoretical position traces the punitive tactics of parties 
to both their own power capability and that of others. This did not make sense, 
intuitively, and it was important to have a theoretical formulation that tied the 
punitive tactics of a party to both their own and the opponent's power capabil-
ity, without reverting to a zero-sum conception of power. 
The second step proposed a solution to this problem, which built the "expec-
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tation of attack" into each theory. The idea for this came from Schelling (1960), 
who had proposed that successful deterrence was contingent on two factors: a 
high fear of retaliation on the part of both actors and a perception that this fear 
will reduce the other's inclination to attack. Notice that this implicitly involves 
an inference from both one's own and the other's absolute power capability. 
Furthermore, a variety of social psychological work had documented that parties 
who formed expectations of attack in a conflict act more competitively even in 
advance of anticipated attacks (see for example, Pruitt, 1981; Rubin & Brown, 
1975; Tedeschi et al., 1969). This fits our early hypotheses about cognitive imag-
ery. Treating expectation of attack as a mediating cognition also had the advan-
tage of incorporating an important facet of each actor's perception of the other's 
perception. 
In the revised formulation (see Figure 3), each actor's use of punitive tactics 
is now a function of both their own and the other's power capabilities, and the 
intervening cognitive processes expand (Lawler, 1986; Lawler & Ford, in press). 
Bilateral deterrence theory predicts that higher punitive power for both actors 
results in each having a higher fear of retaliation (due to the other's high power) 
and lower expectations of attack (due to their own high power). These condi-
tions, in turn, produce lower frequencies of punitive action on the part of both 
parties. In contrast, conflict spiral theory predicts that higher total power will in-
crease the temptation of each actor to use his or her power (due to each actor's 
own power) while also increasing the expectation of attack (due to the other's 
power). These conditions enhance the frequency of punitive action in the dyad. 
Overall, the competition of the theories is somewhat "friendlier" because 
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FIGURE 3 Reformulation of Classical Views 
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of the addition of an identical intervening cognition (i.e., expectations of attack), 
but the differences between them also are sharpened because expectations of at-
tack are based on a party's own power in bilateral deterrence theory and the 
other's power in conflict spiral theory (Lawler & Ford, in press). As this formula-
tion developed, I also made the simplifying assumption that actors would expect 
each other to use the underlying power dimensions in the same way. In other 
words, if A's fear of retaliation is based on B's power, then A will expect B's fear 
of retaliation to be based on A's power. A's expectation of attack, therefore, is 
tantamount to A's perception of B's fear of retaliation. 
Having developed bilateral deterrence and conflict spiral predictions for to-
tal power in the relationship, the third step was to consider equal versus unequal 
power. To this point, the focus had been on each actor's absolute power and on 
the total power in the relationship. If the predictions of each theory for equal 
power relationships (see Figure 3) are simply transposed to an unequal power 
relationship, the conclusion is that both theories predict no difference in the rate 
of punitive tactics (at the level of the dyad) between equal and unequal power 
relationships. In the case of unequal power, the rate of power use by the lower 
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power party would diminish while the higher power party's power use would 
increase proportionately. 
For example, assume both A and B begin with a capability to reduce each 
other's outcomes by 50 percent, but then A's power increases to 60 and B's de-
creases to 40. Bilateral deterrence theory suggests that A's fear of retaliation and 
expectation of attack would decrease, and B's fear of retaliation and expectation 
of attack would increase. Assuming that changes in the fear of retaliation and ex-
pectation of attack are proportional, any increase in A's use of punitive tactics 
would be offset by a corresponding decrease in B's use of punitive tactics. A sim-
ilar conclusion is reached from conflict spiral theory. Thus, without additional 
assumptions, both theories predict no difference between equal and unequal 
power at the dyad level as long as the total power in the relationship remains 
constant. This implication is inconsistent with Emerson's (1962,1972) analysis of 
power-balancing tactics and Bacharach and Lawler's (1981a) analysis of instabil-
ity within unequal power relationships. 
By thinking more about how actors might interpret absolute power levels 
in the context of unequal power, this issue was resolved. From bilateral deter-
rence theory, the prediction was that unequal power relationships would gener-
ate more use of punitive tactics, while from conflict spiral theory the prediction 
was the opposite. The theoretical reasoning underlying these predictions fo-
cused on the relative weight parties would give the mediating cognitions in Fig-
ure 3. I assumed that when actors are in an equal power relationship, they give 
equal subjective weight to the fear of retaliation and expectation of attack in the 
case of bilateral deterrence, and equal subjective weight to temptation and ex-
pectation of attack in the case of conflict spiral (Lawler, 1986). But in an unequal 
power relationship, bilateral deterrence assumes that the higher power party 
gives greater weight to the fear of retaliation (now lower, given the other's lower 
power) and that the lower power party gives greater weight to the expectation of 
attack (now higher, given the other's higher power). The result is that both par-
ties in an unequal power relationship will be inclined toward more use of puni-
tive tactics, but for different reasons. These are the conditions especially likely to 
produce high levels of hostility in a conflict. Extrapolating from the bilateral de-
terrence formulation, unequal power relationships are particularly prone to con-
flict escalation as long as the lower power party has significant absolute power. 
The conflict spiral formulation makes the opposite prediction, less punitive 
action under unequal power than equal power. The lower power party ostensi-
bly submits due to lower temptation; while the higher power party forms corre-
sponding low expectations of attack and anticipates that the difference in power 
capability will produce the desired outcomes without having to actually use the 
capability. You might say that, from conflict spiral theory, deterrence in its uni-
lateral form of one actor deterring another occurs under conditions of unequal 
power. Thus, one finds a bit of conflict spiral logic within deterrence theory and 
a bit of deterrence logic within conflict spiral theory. 
The fourth step was empirical research. We pitted bilateral deterrence and 
conflict spiral theories against one another (Lawler, et al., 1988) using a fairly 
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standard two-party laboratory setting in which participants (1) exchange offers 
across a series of bargaining rounds (e.g., Chertkoff & Esser, 1976; Komorita & 
Barnes, 1969; Siegel & Fouraker, 1960), (2) represent the interests of a group in 
conflict with another group, and (3) could levy punitive damage against each 
other on each round (e.g., Michener & Cohen, 1973). Instructions encouraged an 
individualistic orientation (i.e., maximization of the payoffs for their own group 
without regard to the payoffs of the opposing group). Punitive capability was 
manipulated by varying the maximum amount (i.e., capability) of an opponent's 
resources that the subject could destroy, that is, 10 percent versus 90 percent 
(e.g., Lawler et al., 1988). Punitive behavior was measured by the frequency of 
inflicting damage (with the magnitude fixed) summed across both actors, while 
conciliatory behavior was measured by the total magnitude of concession mak-
ing in the dyad and the likelihood of agreement. 
The empirical evidence supported the predictions of bilateral deterrence 
theory over those of conflict spiral theory. In two studies, the total punitive ca-
pability had a negative impact on the use of punitive tactics; one study indicated 
that this effect occurred mainly in the later phases of the bargaining after sub-
jects experienced the negative consequences of power use (Lawler & Bacharach, 
1987; Lawler et al., 1988). Furthermore, punitive tactics were used more fre-
quently in unequal power relationships than in equal power relationships, and 
there were no differences between high- and low-power actors' use of punitive 
tactics. Similar (though weaker) support for bilateral deterrence occurred for 
conciliatory tactics. Parties in relationships with high total power made larger 
concessions overall than those in relationships with low total power, and they 
made larger concessions when in relationships with equal, compared to un-
equal, power. Significant effects were not observed for the likelihood of agree-
ment across the two experiments (Lawler et al., 1988). * 
In summary, the theory of bilateral deterrence extends the idea of total 
power from dependence-based to coercive-based power (see Lawler, 1992; 
Lawler & Bacharach, 1987). Beyond our experimental evidence, some corrobora-
tion for the extension to coercive power can be found in the deterrence literature 
on international relations, in particular, research dealing with war in bilateral 
and multilateral power systems (e.g., Houweling & Siccama, 1988; Thompson, 
1986). From such literature, if two or more parties develop and maintain high 
levels of coercive power (i.e., capability to damage each other), then each will ei-
ther not use that capability or will use it less frequently, because they fear the 
costs of retaliation. This is termed a "general deterrence" process by Morgan 
(1977). Theories of dependence and coercive power emphasize different types of 
cost but incorporate the same total and relative power proposition. 
'While research evidence currently supports bilateral deterrence theory over conflict spiral, it would 
be premature to reject the conflict spiral formulation. The conflict spiral predictions are likely to ob-
tain under some conditions (for example, if there is a "first strike" incentive for power use). Further 
theoretical and empirical work is needed on the conditions under which conflict spiral effects occur 
(see Lawler & Ford, in press). 
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The distinct lines of research on power dependence and coercive power in 
the program each support the usefulness of a nonzero-sum conception of 
power. In the case of both dependence and punitive forms of power, total power 
has cohesive or integrative effects on the relationship, and these effects are dis-
tinguishable from the effects of relative power or power differences. Both power 
dependence and bilateral deterrence formulations indicate that the primary rea-
son higher total power produces less use of that power is the cost associated 
with power use: opportunity costs for power dependence and retaliation costs 
for bilateral deterrence. In both lines of specific research, furthermore, unequal 
power engenders more hostility and less conciliation in the context of a conflict. 
Bilateral deterrence clarifies the role of unequal power by suggesting why lower 
power parties with substantial power capability may resist efforts at intimidation 
and use power as much as the higher power actor. An effort is needed to under-
stand further the conditions under which unequal power relationships produce 
such resistance rather than compliance by the lower power party. 
STAGE 5: THEORETICAL EXTENSIONS 
Currently, I am addressing several new issues that follow from the nonzero-sum 
approach to power. The first concerns the effectiveness of unilateral initiatives in 
two-party bargaining. The primary question is whether total and relative power 
in a relationship affects the success of the conciliatory tactic (unilateral initia-
tives) proposed by Osgood (1962) and empirically examined by Lindskold 
(1978), Patchen (1987), and Boyle and Lawler (1991). This project integrates ideas 
from Osgood's (1962) notion of GRIT with Lawler's (1986) bilateral-deterrence 
formulation (see Lawler & Ford, 1991). The second issue concerns the emergence 
of a commitment in dyads within a larger exchange network building from the 
work of Cook and Emerson (1978, 1984). We have modified Emerson's concept 
of "relational cohesion" to incorporate both the total and relative dimensions of 
power, and we explain commitment in social exchange from this reformulation 
(Lawler & Yoon, 1990). Each of these theoretical extensions is summarized next. 
P o w e r a n d unilateral initiatives 
This project (Lawler & Ford, in press) addresses the following specific question: 
Given a pattern of conflict between two groups or organizations, how does 
power in the relationship affect the ability of a party to generate mutual concilia-
tion in explicit bargaining through unilateral initiatives? To answer this ques-
tion, we focus on how the power relationship should affect the impressions 
"given off" by unilateral initiatives once parties have reached the bargaining 
table. 
According to Osgood's (1962) original formulation, unilateral initiatives are 
a method of enhancing trust and, thereby, reversing the direction of a conflict 
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escalator from upward to downward. The danger of unilateral initiatives, how-
ever, is that they will be interpreted as a sign of weakness and, thus, result in 
less rather than more conciliation by the opponent (e.g., see Benton, Kelley, & 
Liebling, 1972; Boyle & Lawler, 1991; Komorita & Brenner, 1968; Seigel & Foura-
ker, 1960). The implication is as follows: If unilateral initiatives enhance trust 
more than they give off impressions of weakness, then such tactics should in-
crease the opponent's conciliation; but if unilateral initiatives convey weakness 
more than they enhance trust, then such tactics should backfire and reduce con-
ciliation by the opponent. This simple idea is the starting point for analyzing the 
impact of the power relationship. 
By extending bilateral deterrence predictions to concession behavior, we 
propose how total and relative power capabilities should affect each actor's re-
sponse to unilateral initiatives. To accomplish this, it is first necessary to con-
sider how total and relative power affects perceptions of trust and impressions 
of weakness. Two implicit assumptions are extrapolated from bilateral deter-
rence theory (Lawler, 1986; Lawler & Ford, 1991); (1) Given equal power between 
two parties in explicit bargaining, higher total power in the relationship reduces 
the degree that unilateral initiatives create impressions of weakness; and (2) rela-
tionships with unequal, compared to equal, power reduce the degree that uni-
lateral initiatives create trust. 
Elaborating the first assumption, if each party has considerable coercive ca-
pability and these are known to each, then it is difficult for either party to sustain 
an inference of weakness (or softness) when the opponent engages in unilateral 
concession making. Bilateral deterrence implies that the higher the total power 
in the relation, the quicker and more receptive a party becomes in accepting an 
opponent's unilateral initiatives. This is because higher total power produces 
greater fear of retaliation and lower expectations of unprovoked attack. Thus, in 
relationships where each party has high, rather than low, levels of power capa-
bility, unilateral initiatives should not create impressions of weakness or soft-
ness (Lawler & Ford, 1991). This reasoning leads to the following proposition: 
* Proposition 1: Given equal power in explicit bargaining, if parties have higher rather 
than lower levels of power capability, then the effectiveness of unilateral initiatives 
increases. 
Turning to relative power, unequal power complicates the interpretive task 
of parties facing another who uses unilateral initiatives (Lawler & Ford, 1991). 
From bilateral deterrence theory (ceteris paribus), conflict within an unequal 
power relationship should generate more distrust than conflict in an equal 
power relationship, posing serious problems for unilateral initiatives by either 
party. These problems would be compounded if, as suggested by bilateral deter-
rence notions, the higher power actor argues for solutions that reflect their 
higher power, while the lower power actor argues for more equal solutions 
(Lawler, 1992). The upshot is that parties with an unequal power relation should 
have a more difficult time creating minimal levels of trust in explicit bargaining, 
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especially after an initial period of mutual resistance and hostility. Thus, the ba-
sic proposition is as follows: 
* Proposition 2: Given fixed total power in the relationship, if parties in explicit bar-
gaining have unequal rather than equal power capability, then the effectiveness of 
unilateral initiatives decreases. 
Research on these propositions is underway, and it should provide more indica-
tion of whether the contrast between total and relative power is useful to under-
stand tactical behavior in bargaining. 
Commi tmen t in e x c h a n g e n e t w o r k s 
A "transaction" in social exchange theory is a negotiated solution to a mixed mo-
tive problem (Cook & Emerson, 1978). One often cited difference between social 
and economic exchange is that exchanges in social contexts are not independent 
(Emerson, 1972, 1981). Repetitive exchanges between the same parties tend to 
emerge, and these have social effects that cannot be accounted for by economic-
exchange models. Various theoretical and empirical efforts have attempted to 
understand the sources and consequences of repetitive exchange, frequently 
conceptualized as "commitment processes" (Cook & Emerson, 1978, 1984; Tall-
man, Gray, & Leik, 1991; Williamson, 1975). We are developing a line of research 
that utilizes the nonzero-sum concept of power to elaborate how the power rela-
tionship affects the likelihood of commitment formation (Lawler & Yoon, 1990). 
Commitment formation in dyadic relations is important in part because it can 
produce power balance (i.e., equality) throughout the network (Cook & Emer-
son, 1984) but also fragment a social network, breaking it down into a series of 
disconnected dyads (see Markovsky, Wilier, & Patton, 1988; Wilier, Markovsky, 
& Patton, 1989). 
Commitment is defined broadly as an obligation to maintain a relation over 
time (Tallman, et al., 1991), with continuous repetitive exchange between the 
same actors being the behavioral indicator of that obligation (Cook & Emerson, 
1978, 1984). Our approach is to treat commitment as a property of a relationship 
and focus on mutual or bilateral forms of commitment; in addition, our approach 
is behavioral rather than attitudinal, and the negotiated transaction is the joint 
behavior of primary concern. The longer sequences of repeated exchange signify 
stronger commitments, especially if negotiated exchanges continue despite bet-
ter alternatives. 
To understand the structural sources of commitment, we propose to use 
the contrast of relative and total power to modify Emerson's idea of "relational co-
hesion" (see Lawler & Yoon, 1990). The problem is to combine or integrate the 
effects of relative power with those for total power, such that relational cohesion 
is a result of both higher total power and more equal relative power. One way to 
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characterize the combined effect is as a function of the geometric mean of two ac-
tors' absolute power, as follows: 
Relational Cohesion (C) = VPab x Pba or VDba x Dab, 
where 
Pab is the power of A over B 
Pba is the power of B over A 
Dte is the dependence of B on A 
Dab is the dependence of A on B 
A geometric-mean specification of relational cohesion is similar to Molm's 
(1987) concept of average power since it uses the notion of a mean to capture the 
mutual dependence of actors in a dyad. However, our specification also takes 
into account the effect of relative power. This is important because while arith-
metic average power, adopted by Molm (1987), varies only as a function of the 
sum of the two values of power (i.e., total power), the geometric-mean specifi-
cation varies as a function of both total power and relative power. More specifi-
cally, the relationship of relational cohesion to total power and relative power in 
the geometric-mean specification can be treated in terms of first partial deriva-
tives as follows (see Lawler & Yoon, 1990): 
C = f(TP, RP) 
dC/dRP<0 
ac/aTP>o 
where 
C is relational cohesion 
RP is relative power ( | Pab — Pba | ) 
TP is total power (Pab + Pba) 
As the preceding inequalities in first partial derivatives indicate, relational 
cohesion in our specification is an increasing function of total power if the power 
difference (relative power) effect is constant, while it is an inverse function of 
power difference if the total power effect is constant. Verbally, assuming that re-
lational cohesion underlies commitment formation, the geometric-mean specifi-
cation leads to the following proposition: 
* Proposition 1: If total power in a relationship increases and the power difference de-
creases, then greater commitment will develop. 
Some evidence in support of this idea can be found in Lawler and Bacha-
rach (1987). In that study, two actors bargained over a single, distributive issue 
in a fairly standard two-party bargaining context, except that each could also ne-
gotiate with an alternative person. Relative and total dependence was manipu-
lated by varying the probability of a good agreement from the alternative. 
Coercive capability (i.e., potential to punish) also was manipulated. The results 
indicated that the likelihood of conflict resolution (agreement) was significantly 
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higher when parties had both high total and equal power in their relationship. 
The implication is that in an exchange network, commitments are most likely in 
relations with higher total power and lower power difference. Research in prog-
ress is developing and testing such implications of relational cohesion. 
CONCLUSION 
The nonzero-sum approach to power contains the same fundamental message 
as Tannenbaum's (1968, 1974) concept of control. Both the distribution and the 
total amount of power can vary in a relationship, group, or organization. The to-
tal amount of power or control is essentially the integrative dimension of social 
power, or the degree that parties are dependent on one another to achieve val-
ued goals (Bacharach & Lawler, 1980). Relative power is the distributive dimen-
sion of social power, reflecting differential dependencies among parties who are 
often embedded in organizational hierarchies. These two dimensions capture 
the variable-sum and fixed-sum aspects of social power, respectively, and by in-
corporating them into a single framework, we direct attention to both the divi-
sive and cohesive effects of power in relationships. 
The five stages of the program reflect the development of the nonzero-sum 
conception of power from an implicit to an explicit theme. In work on revolu-
tionary coalitions, the co-optation tactic can be construed as enhancing the in-
fluence of both the leader (who reduces the inclination of the target to form a 
revolutionary coalition) and the target subordinate (who influences the other 
subordinate). Applying Tannenbaum's (1968, pp. 12-20) theory, an increase in 
total control underlies the effectiveness of the co-optation tactic. Turning to the 
early empirical work on power dependence, parties evaluated tactic options 
based on their own dependence (i.e., the other's power) more than the other's 
dependence (i.e., their own power); they treated power dependence in absolute 
rather than relative terms (see Bacharach & Lawler, 1981b). Thus, parties to a 
conflict seemed to adopt a nonzero imagery of power somewhat inconsistent 
with prevailing zero-sum conceptions offered by scholars. 
The nonzero-sum approach to power was developed explicitly in the 1981 
bargaining book (Bacharach & Lawler, 1981a) and in the theories of bilateral de-
terrence and conflict spiral (Lawler, 1986). Assuming a conflict, two primary pre-
dictions reflect the core ideas: First, the greater the total power in a relationship 
(i.e., mutual dependence of parties or bilateral coercive capability), the greater 
the use of conciliatory tactics and the lower the use of punitive tactics in the rela-
tionship. These propositions have received empirical support from relatively 
distinct empirical work on dependence and punitive forms of power (see Bach-
arach & Lawler, 1981a; Lawler & Bacharach, 1987; Lawler, et al., 1988). 
The nonzero-sum approach is being developed further in current work. 
One line of research applies our nonzero-sum approach to the question of what 
power conditions will make unilateral initiatives (Osgood, 1962) more or less ef-
fective in explicit bargaining (Lawler & Ford, 1991). A second line of research 
elaborates the integrative side of social power by reconceptualizing Emerson's 
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(1972) concept of "relat ional cohes ion" as a joint function of h igh total and 
highly equal p o w e r (Lawler & Yoon, 1990). Parties to social exchange should de-
velop s t ronger commi tmen t s over t ime if s tructural condi t ions involve high 
versus low relational cohesion. Both emerg ing lines of work emphas ize the inte-
grative effects that a p o w e r re la t ionship can have in conflict and bargaining. 
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